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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
DANIEL BAGLEY ROGERS : Case No. 20030953-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). The Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah denied Defendant/Appellant's Daniel Bagley 
Rogers ("Mr. Rogers" or "Appellant") Motion to Quash the Bindover for trial on Theft 
by Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-408(1999). R. 175-181. A copy of the denial to Quash Bindover is in Addendum 
A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Mr. Rogers filed a Motion to Quash Bindover where insufficient evidence was 
presented at the first preliminary hearing to support the charge of Theft by Receiving 
Stolen Property as a second degree felony but the magistrate allowed the state to "re-
open" the preliminary hearing, after it had rested its case, and continued the hearing to 
another date to allow the state to present sufficient evidence to support a second degree 
felony charge. 
Issue. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Rogers' Motion to Quash the 
Bindover concluding that the state presented sufficient evidence at the first preliminary 
hearing and determining that even if the state's evidence was insufficient it was simply 
an "innocent miscalculation of the evidence necessary to bindover" which would not 
have precluded refiling? 
Standard of Review: The issue of whether to bind a case over for trial involves a 
question of law which this Court reviews de novo without deference. State v. Rivera , 
954 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Perservation. This issue was preserved below pursuant to State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). R. 48-54, 175-181; 222:47,56; 223:66-67; 226. A copy of 
the Sery plea is in Addendum B. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rules and constitutional provisions are in Addendum C: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3) 
UtahR.Evid. 1102 
Utah Const, art 1, § 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 14, 2002, Mr. Rogers was charged with one count of Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2 
6-408 (1999), and one count of Theft by Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999). R. 1-3. On November 4, 2002, the state filed a 
motion to continue the preliminary hearing set for November 7, 2002, because an 
essential witness was unavailable. R. 21-22. The state's motion was granted. R. 23-24. 
The preliminary hearing was rescheduled for November 26, 2002. R. 25. On November 
26, 2002, Mr. Rogers failed to appear and the court issued a bench warrant. R. 206. 
The preliminary hearing was rescheduled for December 17, 2002. R. 207. 
At the December 17, 2002 preliminary hearing, after the state had rested its case, 
defense counsel asked the court not to bind Mr. Rogers over, arguing that the state 
presented insufficient evidence to support the charge of theft by receiving stolen property 
as a second degree felony and the theft by deception charge. R. 222:45-47. The state 
moved to re-open its case to present more evidence. R. 222:47. The court allowed the 
state to re-open its case over defense counsel's objection. R. 222:47. After presenting 
further evidence, the state argued in favor of bindover. R. 222:50-54. The court 
expressed concern about the sufficiency of the state's evidence regarding the specific 
items recovered and their values which could be attributed to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:51, 54-
56. The court continued the hearing to allow the state to provide evidence on the proof 
of value element for the property that had been recovered which could be attributed to 
Mr. Rogers. R. 222:57-59. The preliminary hearing was continued until January 7, 
2003. R. 222:62-63. At the January, 7, 2003 preliminary hearing, defense counsel 
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renewed her objection to the court for allowing the state to re-open its case. R. 223:66-
67. At the conclusion of the second preliminary hearing, the court bound Mr. Rogers 
over on the charge of theft by receiving stolen property as a second degree felony but 
found insufficient evidence to bind him over on the charge of theft by deception. R 223: 
126, 128. 
On April 10, 2003, Mr. Rogers filed a Motion to Quash the Bindover in the Third 
District Court arguing the magistrate erred in permitting the state to re-open and continue 
its case after having rested. R. 48-54. The state filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
Motion to Quash Bindover on April 29, 2003. R. 153-158. On April 29, 2003, the 
district court heard arguments on the Motion to Quash Bindover. R. 224. On June 16, 
2003, the district court denied Mr. Rogers' Motion to Quash Bindover. R. 175-181. On 
September 15, 2003, Mr. Rogers entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to State v. 
Sery, to an amended charge of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony. 
R. 217, 226. See Addendum B. On October 28, 2003, Mr. Rogers was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years and fined $5,000. R. 219. Mr. Rogers 
prison term and fine were suspended and he was placed on probation for 36 months. R. 
220. Restitution was ordered. R. 221. A timely notice of appeal was filed on November 
18,2003. R. 191. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. FACTS REGARDING THE TWO PRELIMINARY HEARINGS 
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On August 14, 2002, Mr. Rogers was charged with Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property, a second degree felony and Theft by Deception, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-
3. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for November 7, 2002. R. 21. On November 
4, 2002, the state filed a motion to continue the preliminary hearing because an essential 
witness was unavailable. R. 21-23. The state's motion was granted and the preliminary 
hearing was rescheduled for November 26, 2002. R. 23-25. On November 26, 2002, the 
preliminary hearing was again rescheduled until December 17, 2002, when Mr. Rogers 
failed to appear. R. 206-207. 
A. The First Preliminary Hearing 
At the December 17, 2002 preliminary hearing the state presented testimony from 
three witnesses: Mr. Robert Hildebrand, the alleged victim; Mr. Elvin Allen, a baseball 
card shop owner; and Detective Clinton Johnson, from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office. R. 222. 
Mr. Hildebrand testified that his apartment had been burglarized on July 23, 2002. 
R. 222:6-26. After the burglary, Mr. Hildebrand put together a list of the items missing 
from his apartment. R. 222:11, 22. Mr. Hildebrand testified generally as to items that 
were missing including a DVD player, a camera, a stereo, autographed baseballs, 
individual baseball cards, binders of baseball cards, black pearl earrings, and Olympic 
pins. R. 222:7-11. Mr. Hildebrand also gave general testimony regarding what he 
thought each of these missing items was "probably" worth. R. 222:8-11. Although Mr. 
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Hildebrand did not have the list available to reference at the hearing, he testified that the 
list itemized the property that was taken and their values. R. 222:26. 
Mr. Hildebrand called all the baseball card shops and gave them a partial itemized 
list of his most valuable baseball cards that were missing and asked them to keep a look 
out for the cards. R. 222:11-12, 27, 29, 30. About an hour later, Elvin Allen, had two 
individuals come into his shop to sell baseball cards. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen recognized 
many of the cards from the itemized list as those that were reported missing by Mr. 
Hildebrand. R. 222:28, 30. Mr. Allen testified that he picked out a few cards and wrote 
the individuals a check, telling the individuals that they would be unable to cash the 
check that day because it was a holiday. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen then stopped payment on 
his check and called Mr. Hildebrand to tell him his merchandise was at the shop. R. 
222:13, 28. Mr. Allen did not recognize Mr. Rogers as the individual that was in his 
shop that day. R. 222:27. Mr. Allen could not remember in whose name the check was 
made out. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen testified that there was no relationship between the 
check amount and the value of the cards. R.222:31. Mr. Allen testified that he had no 
idea what the value of the baseball cards would have been. R. 222:31. 
Later that day, Mr. Allen's caller l.D. indicated that a check-cashing facility was 
trying to reach him. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen then called Mr. Hildebrand and gave him the 
telephone number of the check cashing facility. R. 222:28-29. After receiving Mr. 
Allen's telephone call, Mr. Hildebrand called the sheriffs office. R. 222:13. Detective 
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Johnson responded to a page that two individuals were being detained by the West 
Valley Police and a sheriffs deputy for trying to cash a check that had been written to 
them by Mr. Allen. R. 222:33-34. Although Detective Johnson did not have the check 
available to reference during the hearing, he testified that he "believed" the check was 
made out to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:34, 50. The prosecutor also did not bring the check to 
court to show whether Mr. Rogers' name was on it. Detective Johnson testified that Mr. 
Rogers had told him that he found the baseball cards by a dumpster in the area of the 
storage units he cleans. R. 222:38. Mr. Hildebrand was then called down to the check 
cashing facility to identify a baseball which was in the front seat of the co-defendant's, 
Joshua Boone,1 girlfriend's vehicle (the vehicle). R. 222:14, 36, 39. Detective Johnson 
testified that although he had never seen Mr. Rogers in the vehicle in question, he was 
told by the co-defendant, Mr. Boone, that Mr. Rogers had asked for a ride. R. 222:36, 
44. Detective Johnson also "believe[d]M Mr. Rogers may have discussed with him that he 
had ridden in the vehicle. R. 222:36. 
In addition to recovering the baseball in the front seat, Mr. Hildebrand testified 
that he recovered his other autographed baseballs except "may be one or two." R. 
222:14. Mr. Hildebrand recovered a lot of his individual baseball cards but not the most 
valuable ones. R. 222:14. The binders of baseball cards had been recovered but the 
'Mr. Boone plead guilty on November 19, 2002 to an amended charge of Theft By 
Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony. R. 27. 
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pages "had been taken out and shuffled" and some of the pages were missing. R. 222:15. 
Two Willie Mays cards had also been recovered which Mr. Hildebrand estimated were 
worth $400 each. R. 222:24. Detective Johnson testified that several items were 
recovered from the vehicle which included several baseball cards in binders from the 
trunk, an autographed baseball in the front passenger seat, and a sealed baseball card on 
the passenger's side floorboard. R. 222:36. Detective Johnson teslified that several 
items were also recovered from a search of co-defendant Boone's apartment (the 
apartment) including the DVD player, several baseball cards in binders and in loose 
photo sheets, and the Olympic pins. R. 222:41. 
At the end of Detective Johnson's testimony the state rested its case. R. 222:44. 
Defense counsel then asked the court not to bind Mr. Rogers over on a second degree 
felony charge because, among other things, the state had failed to present sufficient 
evidence that the value of the items recovered were or exceeded $5,000. R. 222:45-47. 
Defense counsel also asked the court not to bindover on the theft by deception charge. 
R. 222:46. Defense counsel argued that the state had failed to link Mr. Rogers with any 
of the property which was recovered from the apartment and the vehicle. R. 222:46. 
Defense counsel also argued that the only items which might be linked to Mr. Rogers, 
although it was very tenuous, were the cards that were sold to the card shop. R. 222:45-
46. However, the value of those cards had not been established by the state. R. 222:46. 
After defense counsel pointed out the deficiencies in the state's evidence, the 
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prosecutor stated that she "was just given some more information" and asked to re-open 
the state's case to take further testimony from Detective Johnson. R. 222:47. Defense 
counsel objected to the state's motion. R. 222:47. The court allowed the state to re-open 
its case and take further testimony from Detective Johnson. R. 222:47. Detective 
Johnson testified regarding the black pearl earrings taken from Mr. Hildebrand's 
apartment. R. 222:48. Detective Johnson testified that he was given the list of all the 
items taken from Mr. Hildebrand which he used to identify the earrings at a pawn shop. 
R. 222:48-49. Detective Johnson testified that there was a pawn receipt with Mr. Rogers 
name on it but he did not have it available to show the court. R. 222:49. The prosecutor 
also did not bring the pawn receipt to court to establish that Mr. Rogers' name was on it. 
Instead, Detective Johnson testified that the pawn receipt was left in evidence at the 
sheriffs office. R. 222:49. Defense counsel again objected to Detective Johnson's 
testimony, arguing, inter alia, that there was no proof of the pawn receipt to link Mr. 
Rogers to the earrings. R. 222:49. 
The state then argued again in favor of bindover. R. 222:50-51. The court 
concluded that the additional testimony from Detective Johnson regarding the black pearl 
earrings was inadmissible hearsay evidence. R. 222:51. Urging the court to reconsider, 
the prosecutor attempted to explain its failure to bring in the pawn receipt stating: 
Well, I think my argument to that would be . . . that the detective had seen 
it with his own eyes and he's the officer-1 mean, he testified to that, he's 
under oath- that it was a pawn receipt. And he also has the earrings in 
evidence. 
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And unfortunately, I understand this stuff isn't here today. The State had a 
problem with subpoenas, I called him last minute, and he showed up. 
So, if the Court is not thinking they're going to bind over, the State would 
also ask for a continuance to bring in that information which is in evidence; 
but I think that there's . . . plenty for a preliminary hearing. 
R. 222:51-52. 
The court again concluded that the additional testimony was inadmissible hearsay 
evidence and stated that it was Ma little concerned at the level of evidence [it was] 
seeing." R. 222:52. The state again attempted to explain its failure to provide the 
necessary evidence stating: 
And I guess, your Honor, I mean, I have-my first argument would be that, 
even without that pawn ticket, it's sufficient to bind this over, just being 
that he was detained at the Money Mart, where they had just gone to try 
and pawn these cards. 
If it's not, we do have this up in evidence. As I said, I call Detective 
Johnson out of- our subpoenas got mixed up, our victims had been waiting 
here for four hours, so I called him and had him run in. He didn't have the 
time to go to-to the evidence. 
R. 222:54. 
The court determined it had enough evidence to bindover but was concerned that 
the state had failed to specifically identify the value of the items recovered which could 
be attributed to Mr. Rogers to support a second degree felony. R. 222:54-56. The court 
then continued the preliminary hearing to allow the state the opportunity to present 
sufficient evidence as to the value of the recovered items that could be attributed to Mr. 
Rogers. R. 222:56, 58. Defense counsel objected to the continuance arguing that the 
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state had already been given "the opportunity to present that evidence" and defense 
counsel had elicited testimony from every witness that "there was proof of all of these 
items, [but the state] simply . . . opted not to do it." R. 222:56. In explaining its decision 
to continue, the court expressed concerns regarding the "bare minimum[]" level of proof 
that was being presented at preliminary hearings by prosecutors "in these cases tying 
values, people to objects and things like that." R. 145:60. The preliminary hearing was 
then continued until January 7, 2003. R. 145:63-64. 
B. The Second Preliminary Hearing 
At the beginning of the second preliminary hearing, defense counsel renewed her 
objection to the court for allowing the state to re-open and continue the hearing. R. 
223:66-67. The state then called Mr. Hildebrand back to the stand to testify regarding 
the value of the items recovered. R. 223:69-113. Unlike the first hearing, the state 
introduced eleven photographs of the items recovered from the apartment and vehicle to 
elicit detailed testimony from Mr. Hildebrand regarding the value of the items pictured. 
R. 223:69-113. In addition, the state also utilized the itemized list that Mr. Hildebrand 
had made of the property that was missing and their values which all the witnesses had 
referred to in the first preliminary hearing. R. 223:70. With the aid of the itemized list 
and the photographs of the recovered property, the court found that the state was able to 
establish probable cause of the value necessary to bind Mr. Rogers over on Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, as a second degree felony. R. 233:126. Defense counsel 
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objected and again argued that the state had failed to link Mr. Rogers to the property 
found in the vehicle and the apartment. R. 233:117-119. The court found that there was 
a sufficient enough nexus between Mr. Rogers and the property found in the vehicle's 
trunk and the apartment to allow it to be attributed to Mr. Rogers. R. 233:121-125. 
Although, the court determined that Mr. Rogers could only be linked through his 
admission to the baseball cards, it nevertheless determined the state had presented 
sufficient evidence that the value of the cards recovered exceeded the $5,000 threshold. 
R. 223:125 However, the court found their was insufficient probable cause to bind Mr. 
Rogers over on the charge of theft by deception. R. 233:126, 128. 
2. Motion to Quash Bindover 
On April 10, 2003, Mr. Rogers filed a Motion to Quash the Bindover. R. 48-54. 
Mr. Rogers argued that there was insufficient evidence to bind him over on the offense 
of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property as a second degree felony and that the magistrate 
erred in allowing the state to re-open and continue its case. R. 48-54. Mr. Rogers argued 
that a motion to re-open a preliminary hearing is not a recognized motion under the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 48-54. Mr. Rogers raised concerns that defense counsel 
is often running into this situation where the state is simply re-opening its case once 
defense counsel has pointed out its deficiencies. R. 48-54; 224:4-5. Mr. Rogers pointed 
out that the state's remedy, in not having the evidence it needed to support all the 
elements of the offense, was to dismiss the case without prejudice and then refile. R. 48-
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54. However, the state opted to go forward with the preliminary hearing with the 
evidence it had. R. 48-54. Therefore, defense counsel argued this was not a case where 
the prosecutor innocently miscalculated the quantum of evidence needed for a bindover. 
R. 48-54; 224:4. 
The state argued that it had presented sufficient evidence in the first preliminary 
hearing to bind Mr. Rogers over on a second degree felony. R. 153-158; 224:10-12, 15. 
The state also argued that there was no prejudice because it could have refiled its case 
and the testimony would have come in. R. 153-158. The trial court agreed with the state 
that there was sufficient evidence presented at the first preliminary hearing to show that 
Mr. Rogers possessed the required $5,000 or more of property. R. 180. In addition, the 
trial court determined that even if the state presented insufficient evidence at the first 
preliminary hearing, the fact that a motion to re-open is not a recognized procedure 
would not have precluded the state from re-filing because the prosecutor innocently 
miscalculated the evidence necessary to bindover, therefore, it was harmless error. R. 
180 n.2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it denied Mr. Rogers' Motion to Quash, concluding that 
the state presented sufficient evidence at the first preliminary hearing and determining 
that the granting of the state's motion to re-open and the continuance of the preliminary 
hearing was harmless error, because if the charges had been dismissed the state could 
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have simply refiled under Rule 7(i)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure since the 
prosecutor "innocent[ly] miscalculated]. . .the evidence necessary to bindover. R. 180. 
However, the record supports that the prosecutor did not innocently miscalculate the 
evidence needed for bindover but was dilatory in her preparation and took a calculated 
risk in going forward with the first preliminary hearing without the evidence needed to 
obtain a bindover. Taking such a calculated risk rather than dismissing and re-filing, 
does not qualify as an "innocent miscalculation," justifying refiling. Rather, when a 
prosecutor's unpreparedness results in insufficient evidence necessary for a bindover, 
refiling under Rule 7 is limited by due process and the principles ofBrickey. 
The prosecutor's failure to prepare resulted in the state's inability to present 
sufficient evidence on essential elements of the offense. The state failed to present 
sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Rogers possessed or controlled the recovered 
property found in the apartment and the vehicle. The state also failed to present 
sufficient evidence on the proof of value element of the offense to support a second 
degree felony charge. The prosecutor knew that this case dealt with very "unique" items 
where a value would not be easily attributed to the recovered items. However, the record 
demonstrates that the prosecutor failed to elicit testimony from the witnesses or come 
prepared with the evidence necessary to establish these elements. 
Once the magistrate determined that the state had presented insufficient evidence 
on essential elements of the offense, Rule 7 mandated that the magistrate dismiss the 
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information or bind defendant over on a reduced charge. Court rules do not allow 
magistrates to re-open or continue a hearing, under these circumstance, to allow the state 
another opportunity to present sufficient evidence on essential elements of the offense. 
Such a practice is potentially abusive because it is akin to allowing the state to dismiss 
and refile a case while effectively circumventing due process and the protections outlined 
in Brickey. Because the prosecutor's dilatory preparation would have prohibited the 
state from refiling, the magistrate's decision to allow the state to re-open and continue 
the hearing was not harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. A PROSECUTOR'S CONSCIOUS DECISION TO PROCEED 
WITH A PRELIMINARY HEARING DESPITE BEING UNPREPARED 
DOES NOT QUALIFY AS AN "INNOCENT MISCALCULATION" OF 
THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR BINDOVER: TO 
ALLOW THE STATE TO RE-OPEN AND CONTINUE A CASE IN 
ORDER TO ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF AN OFFENSE 
AFTER IT HAS TAKEN SUCH A CALCULATED RISK VIOLATES 
DUE PROCESS AND THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN BRICKEY . 
A. Due Process and Brickey Limit Refiling Under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the state to refile a charge 
after its "dismissal and discharge" by a magistrate. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3).2 While rule 
2Rule 7 does not allow the state to "re-open" the preliminary hearing once it has 
rested its case, nor does it allow for a continuance under these circumstances. See Point 
B supra; see also State v. Johnson, 1989 Utah App. LEXIS 172, *3 (October 30, 
1989)(unpublished opinion) (determining that "[a] motion to "reopen" a preliminary 
hearing is not a motion recognized in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure"). Even 
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7 gives the state discretion to institute a "subsequent prosecution for the same offense," 
that discretion is limited by the Brickey jurisprudence. In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 
(Utah 1986) the supreme court held that "due process considerations prohibit a 
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence 
unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced 
or that other good cause justifies refiling." Id. at 647; see also State v. Redd, 2001 UT 
113,1[13, 37 P.3d 1160; State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87,1fl 1, 34 P.3d 767. In Morgan. 
2001 UT 87 at [^19, the supreme court adopted "innocent miscalculation" as a 
subcategory of "other good cause." In doing so, the court cautioned "that the 
miscalculation must be innocent" (id. (emphasis added) "and not be used for purposes 
which would violate due process rights of the defendant." Redd , 2001 UT 113 at ^13. 
"By limiting the circumstances under which the [s]tate may refile criminal charges, this 
rule ensures that the defendant is not harassed by repeated charges on tenuous grounds." 
State v. FisL 966 P.2d 860, 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Hence, while rule 7(i) does allow 
refiling in some circumstances, due process and Brickey limit refiling to circumstances 
though the case was not dismissed and refiled in this instance, Appellant argues that the 
principles of Brickey and due process apply. This is not only because the trial court 
incorrectly determined that had the charges been dismissed, instead of the state being 
allowed to "re-open" and continue the preliminary hearing, the state would not have been 
precluded from refiling but also because the result of re-opening and continuing the 
hearing was akin to dismissing and refiling thereby implicating the very same 
fundamental fairness and due process concerns addressed in the Brickey jurisprudence. 
See Conclusions of Law R. 180 n.2; see. also Point B. 
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where the state has new or previously unavailable evidence or some other circumstances 
exist which rise to the level of good cause to justify refiling. 
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the due process concerns which were 
addressed in the Brickey jurisprudence demonstrate that when an unprepared prosecutor 
consciously decides to go forward with a preliminary hearing and fails to establish 
sufficient evidence on all the elements of the offense charged, it cannot be claimed that 
the prosecutor's failure was simply an "innocent miscalculation of the quantum of 
evidence necessary to bindover," justifying refiling. If prosecutors were allowed to go 
forward with preliminary hearings unprepared, then permitted to refile when they fail to 
meet their burden under the guise that they simply miscalculated the amount of evidence 
necessary for a bindover, prosecutors would be permitted to refile every time a case is 
dismissed, and none of the due process protections which are served by limiting refiling 
would be met. 
Because the primary purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether 
sufficient evidence exists to warrant further proceedings, M[t]he preliminary hearing thus 
acts as a screening device to 'ferret out. . .groundless and improvident prosecutions.'" 
Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 
1980)). The role of the preliminary hearing in "ferret[ing] out . . . groundless and 
improvident prosecutions . . . is important because it not only relieves the accused of the 
'substantial degradation and expense' attendant to a criminal trial, but also because it 
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helps conserve judicial resources and promotes confidence in the judicial system." 
Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646 (citing Anderson, 612 P.2d at 784). Precluding the state from 
refiling unless new or previously unavailable evidence or other good cause exists ensures 
that groundless or improvident prosecutions do not proceed, protects the defendant from 
the degradation and expense of having to defend at more than one preliminary hearing, 
conserves judicial resources by not allowing the state to repeatedly waste court time by 
refiling cases and conducting multiple preliminary hearings, and prevents prosecutors 
from "harras[ing] defendants by refiling criminal charges which had previously been 
dismissed for insufficient evidence." Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647. These Brickey 
protections directly apply in this case where the effect of the re-opened or continued 
preliminary hearing implicates the very same fundamental fairness and due process 
concerns. See n.l; Point B. 
"Considerations of fundamental fairness preclude vesting the State with such 
unbridled discretion [to reopen or continue a preliminary hearing]" Brickey, 714 P.2d at 
647 (citing Jones v. State. 481 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Stockwell v. 
State. 573 P.2d 116, 138-39 (Idaho 1977); People v. Walls . 324 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Mich. 
App. 1982)). This is true not only because of the "'substantial degradation and expense'" 
(Brickev. 714 P.2d at 646 (quoting State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778, 784 (Utah 1980)) of 
being subjected to multiple preliminary hearings, but also because the good faith of the 
prosecutor fails to protect the accused from the potential harassment when a prosecutor 
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has complete freedom to re-open or continue a preliminary hearing. Id.. Indeed, "the 
potential for abuse [is] inherent in the power" to re-open or continue a preliminary 
hearing without any limitation as it is in the power to refile. Id_ at 647 (citing inter alia 
Holmes v. District Court. 668 P.2d 11, 15 (Colo. 1983)). 
Brickey recognized that the act of refiling itself constitutes harassment, squanders 
judicial resources, and is fundamentally unfair in violation of due process unless the 
prosecutor establishes that new evidence has surfaced or other good cause exists. IcL_ at 
646-47; see also Redd. 2001 UT 113 at^|20, Morgan. 2001 UT 87 at 1fl5, Fisk, 966 P.2d 
at 864. Brickey jurisprudence also recognized that a prosecutor's failure to introduce 
evidence on an element of the charged offense does not qualify as "innocent" and refiling 
would violate a defendant's due process rights. Id. at 648; see also Redd, 2001 UT 113 
at ^fl7. The same is true of allowing a prosecutor, who is unprepared to establish the 
essential elements of the offense charged, the opportunity to re-open or continue a 
preliminary hearing. If not, and a prosecutor's unpreparedness, which results in a failure 
to present sufficient evidence necessary for a bindover is held to qualify as an "innocent" 
miscalculation, then there would be no ramifications for a prosecutor who simply decides 
to take a chance and go forward with the preliminary hearing unprepared. Such a rule 
would likewise lead to multiple preliminary hearings in many cases, thereby requiring 
increased judicial resources, while also subjecting defendants to the degradation and cost 
of repeatedly defending the charge. Such a rule would also strip preliminary hearings of 
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their role as a discovery tool since prosecutors could put on only a bare bones case, then 
either re-open and continue or re file the information if they miscalculate the amount of 
evidence needed. 
If such conduct would qualify as "innocent," the Brickey rule would be 
eviscerated since it is difficult to contemplate any situations which would not qualify as 
"innocent." However, "[o]verreaching by the State, in any of its forms, is the chief evil 
[the Supreme Court] sought to prevent in Brickey." Morgan, 2001 UT 87, TJ15, 34 P.3d 
767. Such conduct does not qualify as "innocent" and due process thereby not only bars 
refiling but prohibits re-opening or continuing a hearing where a prosecutor makes a 
calculated decision to go forward with a preliminary hearing unprepared and fails to 
produce sufficient evidence on essential elements of the offense. Therefore, the trial 
court erred in determining that had the magistrate followed criminal procedural rules and 
not allowed the state to re-open and continue the hearing when it had failed to produce 
sufficient evidence, the state would not have been precluded from re-filing. 
1. Brickey and Due Process Bar Refiling and Prohibit Re-Opening or 
Continuing A Preliminary Hearing Where A Prosecutor Makes a Calculated 
Decision To Go Forward With the Hearing Unprepared and Fails to Produce 
Sufficient Evidence On Essential Elements of the Offense. 
The supreme court has determined that the state does not innocently 
miscalculate the quantum of evidence when it fails to present evidence on an essential 
element of the crime. See Redd 2001 UT 113 at *|17. Surely, fundamental fairness, 
"[t]he lodestar of Brickey," would dictate that a prosecutor who goes forward with a 
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preliminary hearing unprepared likewise does not "innocently" miscalculate the quantum 
of evidence but, instead, engages in a potentially abusive practice which raises a 
presumption against refiling. Morgan. 2001 UT 92 at 1fl5; Redd. 2001 UT 113 at TJ13 
("when potential abusive practices are involved, the presumption is that due process will 
bar refiling."). Indeed, this type of calculated decision by a prosecutor is the very type of 
"abusive practice" the Brickey jurisprudence and due process seeks to prevent. R. 157. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that the state would not have been 
precluded from refiling if the charges had been dismissed because "there were no abusive 
practices involved in the State's motion to reopen, but simply an innocent miscalculation 
of the evidence necessary to bindover." R. 180 n.2. 
The presumption, that the state has violated a defendant's due process rights and 
is barred from refiling, can only "be overcome by showing that new or previously 
unavailable evidence or other good cause justifies refiling." Id. The record, in this case, 
does not support such a showing justifying refiling. Instead, the record indicates the 
prosecutor was dilatory in her preparation which caused her to fail to meet the state's 
burden of proof on essential elements of the offense during the first preliminary hearing. 
The prosecutor was aware that this case involved the recovery of very distinctive 
items stating "[tjhis case is unique in that the items that were stolen are baseball cards 
and other memorabilia that won't have an easy value attached to them . . . ." R. 223:68. 
Evidence of possession or control and proof of value of the recovered property are two 
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clear and essential elements in establishing a second degree felony charge of theft by 
receiving stolen property. See Utah Code Ann.§76-6-412 (l)(a). Therefore, it was 
imperative for the state to not only link Mr. Rogers to the recovered property but 
decipher, with specificity, which of the unique items were recovered and their correlating 
value. Instead of having the evidence available which was necessary to establish the 
proof of value element and Mr. Roger's link to the recovered property, the prosecutor 
went forward with the preliminary hearing ill prepared to meet the state's burden. 
During direct examination of the state's witnesses, the prosecutor was not 
prepared to elicit testimony that might establish what specific property was missing or 
recovered and its value. Each witness testified on several occasions that they had an 
itemized list of the missing items and their values that they used to identify the recovered 
property. R. 222:11, 21-22, 25-27, 29-30, 48. However, the prosecutor failed to make 
the list available to assist the witnesses with their testimony in ascertaining for the court 
which of the unique items listed were recovered and their correlating value. Without the 
list or exhibits of the recovered property, the witnesses were only able to engage in a type 
of guessing game as to what items were missing or recovered and their value. For 
example, Mr. Hildebrand could only speculate during his testimony regarding what he 
was missing and the items "probablfe]" worth. R. 222:8-10. Mr. Hildebrand testified in 
part that "[t]here was a series of autographed baseballs missing, the most valuable of 
which was . . . I think it's worth well over 500 now." "I think there were eleven other 
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baseballs . . . and they probably are worth..." "There were about ten binders missing, of 
cards." "[S]everal sets of cards that are very specialty . . .And Pm guessing that each of 
those sets had a value . . ." R. 222:8-9; Se^ also supra Point a. These types of 
speculative statements are indicative of the rest of Mr. Hildebrand's testimony. In fact, 
Mr. Hildebrand testified during cross-examination that without the assistance of his 
itemized list he was unable to remember specifics regarding his autographed baseballs 
stating "I would have to bring you the list. We may have the list available of- of who all 
the name were on the balls." R. 222:21 "I can't remember if it's not there[.]" R. 222:21. 
Later, Mr. Hildebrand did remember some of the names on the baseballs he was missing 
but again was only able to speculate as to their value. R. 222:21-22. 
The prosecutor was also unprepared to elicit anything more than speculative 
statements from the witnesses in an attempt to establish whether the items "recovered" 
were indeed worth $5,000 or more as is required under the statute. See 76-6-
412(l)(a)(i). For example, Mr. Hildebrand testified that he recovered such items as, the 
"most valuable" baseball, he "believe[d] all of [the autographed baseballs]" although 
"there may be one or two missing," "[a] lot of the cards . . . but unfortunately most of the 
valuable ones were not recovered," "many of the binders" although "pages . . . are 
missing." R. 222:14-15. Detective Johnson's testimony equally consisted of very 
ambiguous testimony regarding what was actually recovered. Detective Johnson testified 
in part that "several items, several baseball cards in folders" "a signed baseball" and "[a] 
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sealed baseball card" were recovered from the vehicle. R. 222:36. 
The evidence that may have taken this testimony out of the realm of speculation, 
the list and exhibits, the prosecutor did not bring to the first preliminary hearing. So 
although the prosecutor recognized the uniqueness of the items missing and the difficulty 
in establishing a value, she did not come to the first preliminary hearing prepared with 
the very evidence that all the witnesses testified they used to assist them and that Mr. 
Hildebrand specifically testified he needed to remember the specifics about the recovered 
property and its value. Furthermore, the evidence the prosecutor admited in the second 
preliminary hearing amplifies the prosecutor's lack of diligence in preparing for the first. 
Unlike the first hearing, the state found it necessary to introduce eleven photographs of 
the items recovered from the apartment and vehicle and the itemized list to assist Mr. 
Hildebrand in remembering specifics regarding the value of the items pictured. R. 
223:69-113. 
Finally, the prosecutor's dilatory preparation is most illustrative during her attempt 
to establish probable cause on the charge of Theft by Deception when she implicitly 
acknowledged that she was not adequately prepared for the first preliminary hearing. R. 
2; 222:28-32, 48-54. To support this charge the prosecutor needed to provide probable 
cause evidence that Mr. Rogers "obtained or exercised control over the property of 
Drawn Pawn by deception, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the 
24 
value of said property is less than $300. R. 2.3 The prosecutor had to produce sufficient 
evidence to establish a link between Mr. Rogers and the cards sold to Mr. Allen. 
Alternatively, the prosecutor had to link Mr. Rogers to the pawned black pearl earrings. 
See n.3. However, the prosecutor failed to bring in either the check allegedly written by 
Mr. Allen for the sale of the baseball cards or the pawn receipt for the black pearl 
earring, therefore, there was no evidence linking Mr. Rogers to the items and the charge 
was ultimately dismissed. R. 223:128. 
In regard to the baseball cards sold to Mr. Allen, Mr. Allen was only able to give 
general testimony regarding two individuals who came into his shop with "a bunch of 
cards." R. 222:28. Mr. Allen testified that he did not recognize Mr. Rogers as one of 
those individuals. R. 222:27. Mr. Allen "picked out a few of [the baseball cards]" and 
wrote the individuals a check. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen could not remember in whose name 
the check was made out. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen testified on cross-examination that there 
was no relationship between the value of the cards and the amount of the check. In fact, 
Mr. Allen had no idea what the value of the cards he purchased would have been. R. 
3It was later clarified that the check written by Mr. Allen for the baseball cards 
was meant to serve as the basis for this charge. "Drawn Pawn" was incorrectly 
transcribed and should have been "Crown Pawn. However, the court determined that it 
understood the evidence regarding the black pearl earring to serve as the basis for the 
Theft by Deception charge concluding to not bind the charge over on that basis. R. 
223:127-28. Regardless of the ultimate reason the court decided not to bind over this 
charge, this charge is referenced to further highlight the prosecutor's lack of 
preparedness to go forward with the preliminary hearing. 
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222:31. 
The prosecutor never elicited testimony about the amount of the check, never 
elicited testimony about the specific cards Mr. Allen picked out to buy, never elicited 
testimony about the specific cards Mr. Hildebrand came and recovered from Mr. Allen, 
and never elicited testimony about the cards Mr. Allen had on his itemized list that he 
used to identify Mr. Hildebrand's missing cards. Similarly, Detective Johnson was only 
able to testify that he nbelieve[d]" the check was made out to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:37. 
However, Detective Johnson could not link Mr. Rogers to the baseball cards bought by 
Mr. Allen because he did not know whether the check related back to the baseball cards 
sold to Mr. Allen since he "never responded to the baseball card shop where the check 
originated from." R. 222:37. Indeed, the prosecutor could not link Mr. Rogers to the 
check because she failed to bring to court the actual check to establish who it originated 
from, in whose name it was made out, and the amount. 
After the state rested, defense counsel argued for the court not to bindover. R. 
222:45-47. After defense counsel had pointed out the state's failure to meet its burden of 
proof, the state asked to re-open the hearing to take further testimony from Detective 
Johnson regarding the pawning of the black pearl earrings. R. 222:47. Over defense 
counsel's objection, the court allowed the state to re-open their case. R. 222:47. 
Upon re-questioning, Detective Johnson testified that he recovered the black pearl 
earrings from a pawnshop. R. 222:48. Detective Johnson testified that he was able to 
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identify the black pearl earrings from the list given to him of all the items missing from 
Mr. Hildebrand. R. 222:48. Detective Johnson testified that there was a pawn receipt 
that indicated that Mr. Roger's pawned the earrings, however, the detective did not bring 
that receipt to court. R. 222:49. The prosecutor also did not bring a copy of the receipt 
to link Mr. Rogers to the pawned earrings. In arguing again in favor of bindover, the 
prosecutor stated that M[a]nd although we don't have the check here today, you heard 
from the officer that he had seen the check and . . . he believes it was made out to [Mr.] 
Rogers." R. 222:50 (emphasis added). The court determined that the additional 
testimony was inadmissible to show the earrings were pawned. R. 222:51. 
In an attempt to persuade the court to change its determination, the prosecutor 
implicitly acknowledged that she was not prepared to go forward on the case stating: 
And unfortunately, I understand this stuff isn't here today. The State had a 
problem with subpoenas, I called him last minute, and he showed up. 
R. 222:52. 
After the court reiterated its position on the pearl earrings, the record again 
illustrates that the prosecutor knew she was not prepared to go forward with the 
preliminary hearing stating: 
And I guess, your Honor, I mean, I have-my first argument would be that, 
even without that pawn ticket, it's sufficient to bind this over, just being 
that he was detained at the Money Mart, where they had just gone to try 
and pawn these cards. 
If it's not, we do have this up in evidence. As I said, I call Detective 
Johnson out of- our subpoenas got mixed up, our victims had been waiting 
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here for four hours, so I called him and had him run in. He didn't have the 
time to go to-to the evidence. 
R. 222:54 (emphasis added). 
The prosecutor knew7 that the recovery of unique items was in question here and 
that ambiguous testimony would not establish the essential elements of the offense. If 
the prosecutor had prepared, she might have known that the itemized list that each 
witness testified to having and pictures of the recovered property would be necessary to 
have at the hearing in order to assist the witnesses in ascertaining what property was 
specifically recovered and its value. In addition, had the prosecutor prepared, she might 
have known that the other significant pieces of evidence, the pawn receipt and the check, 
would be necessary in establishing the alleged link to Mr. Rogers with the recovered 
property. However, it wasn't until the second preliminary hearing that the prosecutor 
came prepared with Mr. Hildebrand's itemized list and exhibits to establish the proof of 
value element. See R. 223. 
Concluding that the prosecutor's failure to present sufficient evidence on essential 
elements of the offense under these circumstances simply amounted to an "innocent" 
miscalculation of the quantum of evidence would eviscerate the holdings in the Brickey 
jurisprudence and the due process protections they provide. Futhermore, allowing a 
prosecutor to re-open or continue a preliminary hearing after she has made a conscious 
decision to go forward unprepared would fly in the face of the consideration of 
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fundamental fairness outlined in the Brickey jurisprudence and would subject defendants 
to the very type of abusive practices the supreme court set out to curb. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in failing to quash the bindover. 
2. Brickey and Due Process Bar Refiling and Prohibit Re-Opening or Continuing 
A Preliminary Hearing When the State Fails to Produce Sufficient Evidence On 
Essential Elements of the Offense. 
In Redd, the supreme court added to the list of potentially abusive practices 
determining that the state does not "innocently miscalculate" the quantum of evidence 
necessary for bindover when it fails to "provide any evidence on a clear element of the 
relevant criminal statute." Id at ^fl7. The supreme court held that refiling after a 
dismissal under such a circumstance is a "potentially abusive practice" raising "the 
presumption . . .that the [s]tate has violated the due process rights of defendant." kL_ The 
court's decision demonstrates the state's essential burden of proof, at a preliminary 
hearing, is to "introduce sufficient evidence to persuade the magistrate that there is 
probable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it. . . ." State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). And although the "evidence need not be capable of supporting a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," the state still must produce "believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^[15, 20 
P.3d300. 
In this case, the evidence when "viewed in a light most favorable to the 
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prosecution", and "drawing all reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor," did not 
support a finding of probable cause that Mr. Rogers possessed or controlled the property 
recovered from the apartment or the vehicle and failed to establish that the value of the 
recovered property supported a second degree felony. State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, 
Tfl3, 44 P.3d 730. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that the state produced 
sufficient evidence establishing Mr. Rogers "was in possession or control of $5000 or 
more of stolen property." R. 180. 
a. The state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Rogers 
possessed or controlled the recovered property found in the apartment or the 
vehicle. 
The state charged Mr. Rogers with Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408. Section 76-6-408 (1) -(2)(a) 
lays out the relevant elements of this offense which are: 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, 
or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: (a) is found in possession or control of other property 
stolen on a separate occasion. 
Possession or control of the recovered property is a clear and essential element of 
this offense. See State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1986) (discussing elements of 
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possession of stolen property). Once the magistrate determined he would continue the 
preliminary hearing he indicated his predisposition for finding all of the recovered 
property found in the apartment and the vehicle to be in Mr. Rogers possession.4 R. 
222:56-58; 223:117. Because the evidence would at most support that Mr. Rogers was a 
passenger in the vehicle, it was necessary for the state to put on some evidence to support 
a probable cause finding that Mr. Rogers was in constructive possession of the property 
recovered from the vehicle's trunk and the apartment. See State v. Layman. 1999 UT 79, 
TJ13, 985 P.2d 911; State v. Salas. 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
initially the magistrate indicated that Mr. Rogers would only be found to be in 
possession of the baseball cards based on "the statements made by [Mr. Rogers] to the 
officer and the statements made by the co-defendant." R. 222:55-57. However, once the 
magistrate decided to continue the hearing he determined he was not "going to cut it 
[that] closely" and concluded that Mr. Rogers would be found in possession of all the 
recovered property found in the vehicle and apartment. R. 222:57-58. At the conclusion 
of the second preliminary hearing the magistrate once again determined "that [the] other 
items were not included" and Mr. Rogers would only be found to be in possession of the 
baseball cards recovered. R. 223:125. 
The trial court concluded that ff[d]efense counsel did not object" to the 
magistrate's decision that the recovered property found in the apartment would be 
considered. R. 180. To the extent that this conclusion is actually a finding of fact, it is 
erroneous. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). The record supports 
that defense counsel not only argued at the first preliminary hearing that there was no 
evidence linking Mr. Rogers to the recovered property found in the vehicle and 
apartment [R. 222:45-46] but demonstrates defense counsel's objection to Mr. Rogers 
being attributed with the recovered property from the vehicle and apartment was again 
argued at the conclusion of the second preliminary hearing and the magistrate considered 
and ruled on the objection. R. 222:56-58; 223:117-125; See_ State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 
769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting defendant's objection timely because he "met the 
requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial 
court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)). 
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Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985). To show that Mr. Rogers constructively possessed 
the recovered property, "it is necessary that 'there be a sufficient nexus between [Mr. 
Rogers] and the [recovered property] to permit an inference that [Mr. Rogers] had both 
the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the [recovered 
property].5" Layman, 1999 UT 79 at If 13. However, the prosecutor failed to present 
sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding that Mr. Rogers constructively 
possessed or controlled the property recovered from the vehicle or apartment. 
The evidence regarding the recovered property from the vehicle is as follows: 
1. Mr. Hildebrand was called down to a check cashing facility in West 
Valley to take a look at a baseball that was sitting on the front seat of a car. 
R. 222:13-14. Mr. Hildebrand was able to identify this baseball as "one 
that was the most valuable of all those . . . balls that [he] had mentioned 
before." R. 222:14. 
2. Part of the property was recovered from a vehicle that was lent to co-
defendant Boone specifically. R. 222:43-44. 
3. Detective Johnson had seen the recovered property in co-defendant 
Boone's girlfriend's vehicle. R. 222:36. "[T]here were several items, 
several baseball cards in folders, like photo albums in the trunk." R. 
222:36. "[I]n the front passenger seat, there was a baseball, a signed 
baseball, that was in a case, a plastic square case. And there was also 
another sealed baseball card on the - I believe it was on the floorboard of 
the passenger side." R. 222:36, 40-41. 
4. Detective Johnson had "never seen [Mr. Rogers] in the vehicle." R. 
222:36. Detective Johnson "believe[d]" Mr. Rogers may have discussed 
with him that "he had ridden in the vehicle or that he had shown up with 
the" codefendant. R. 222:36 
5. Although Detective Johnson had never seen Mr. Rogers in the vehicle, 
co-defendant Boone had told him that Mr. Rogers had asked Boone for a 
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ride to sell some cards. R. 222:43-44. 
The only evidence offered regarding the recovered property from the apartment 
was elicited during cross-examination and was as follows: 
1. Detective Johnson did not have any information that Mr. Rogers resided 
at co-defendant Boone's apartment. R. 222:42. Detective Johnson 
believed that Boone shared the apartment with his girlfriend. R. 222:41. 
2. A search of co-defendant Boone's apartment revealed "[t]he DVD/CD 
player, . . . several cards, and the Olympic pins, things like that." R. 
222:41. Binders were recovered from under the bed, in the kitchen 
cupboards and in the furnace room. R. 222:41. 
Other than this above testimony defense counsel elicited, no evidence was offered 
by the state to link Mr. Rogers to the property recovered from the apartment. In fact, the 
state never even addressed nor attempted to elicit any testimony regarding the recovered 
property found from the apartment. The evidence presented might tenuously establish, at 
most, a nexus between Mr. Rogers and the recovered property found inside the vehicle 
which consisted of "a baseball" and "a baseball card." However, the evidence presented 
regarding the recovered property from the vehicle's trunk and apartment, even when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the state, fails to establish a sufficient nexus with Mr. 
Rogers to permit an inference that he had both the power to exercise dominion and 
control over this recovered property. 
Therefore, because the state failed to show that Mr. Rogers had possession or 
control over the recovered property, it failed to present sufficient evidence on an 
essential element of the offense barring refiling under Brickey and due process. 
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Alternatively, even if the evidence established that Mr. Rogers possessed or controlled 
the baseball and card found inside the vehicle, insufficient evidence was presented on the 
value of these items to support the charged offense. See Point b. 
b. The state failed to present sufficient evidence on the proof of value element 
to support a second degree felony charge. 
In addition to producing sufficient evidence on the elements listed in section 76-
6-408, it was imperative for the state to produce sufficient evidence on the proof of value 
element making this offense a second degree felony, meaning the "value of the property 
or services [was] or exceeded] $5,000." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(a)(i). If the 
state's evidence on the proof of value element was less than $5,000, the degree of the 
offense drops accordingly. Hence, if "the value of the property . . .is or exceeds $1,000 
but is less than $5,000" the offense is punishable as a third degree felony. Utah Code 
Ann § 76-6-412 (l)(b) (2003). If "the value of the property . . . is or exceeds $300 but is 
less than $1,000" it is punishable as a class A misdemeanor. IdL (l)(c). If "the value of 
the property . . . is less than $300" it is punishable as a class B misdemeanor. Ll_ (l)(d). 
At the first preliminary hearing, the magistrate determined that the prosecutor 
presented insufficient evidence on the proof of value element stating "I don't have 
enough information about how much material was found and the value of the material 
found as contrasted with the value of the material stolen... I can't assume that all the 
material that was possessed actually was all the material stolen...." R. 222:58. 
Nevertheless, the trial court, in denying Mr. Rogers' motion to quash, concluded that the 
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state had presented sufficient evidence at the first preliminary hearing to establish that 
Mr. Rogers "was in possession or control of $5,000 or more of stolen property." R. 180. 
The evidence from the first preliminary hearing even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution only establishes that the witnesses were at most 
engaged in a type of guessing game as to what exactly was missing and its probable 
worth. 
The state offered the following evidence from Mr. Hildebrand regarding what 
property he was missing and his speculation as to what it was worth. 
Well, the DVD player is a very top line model and retails for about $750. 
There was a camera missing that's worth about 200. There was a stereo 
missing that originally costs about 900, it's probably worth four or five 
hundred now. 
There was a series of autographed baseballs missing, the most valuable of 
which was-I bought many years ago, for about 400 and I think it's worth 
well over 500 now. There were several other-there was- I think there were 
eleven other baseballs besides that one and they probably are worth, three 
of them are worth about fifty bucks and the others are all worth about a 
hundred to 150, each. 
There were about ten binders missing, of cards . . . There were several sets 
of cards that are very specialty, not just normal card sets, but very hard to 
put together. And I'm guessing that each of those sets had a value 
anywhere from 200 to $500. And there were about six of those contained 
within those pages, or more. So, that's probably just in those, maybe about 
$3,000. 
There were cards based on individual players, some star players of the past, 
and-and just hundreds and hundreds of cards on each one of those. And 
those cards probably were easily worth another $2,000. 
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. . . but there was definitely a black pearl earring set that was gone.. . . but 
the black pearl earrings alone originally cost me twelve hundred and fifty 
dollars and are probably worth about fifteen hundred now. 
The cards that were underneath the bed, those were all individually encased 
car-cards in individual little plastic containers. There was a series of cards 
there that are autographed by players from 50 years ago that are still alive. 
And there's only 200 of each of those players' cards in existence in the 
world. And I had about 50 of those. And - no, that's not correct, I had 
about 35 of those; and the most valuable, which was a Willie Mays, there 
were three of those5, those are worth four hundred each. And there were 
other players, worth in the hundred and fifty to two hundred dollar range, 
and then others, perhaps about a hundred or less . . . . 
And that's just one series. There were quite a few other cards. This-this 
box contained about 300 cards of various types. 
. . . There were some Olympic pins. I have collected those since the 
Olympics this year. There were several very special ones that were in little 
cases that looked like jewelry . . . . And there was probably a couple 
hundred dollars' worth of those. 
R. 222:8-11.6 
5Mr. Hildebrand later clarified that he actually was only missing two Willie Mays 
cards. R. 222:24. 
6The trial court found that this testimony established that the following items were 
"stolen." 
Specifically, an unopened six disc, DVD player worth $750, a minolta 35 
mm camera worth $200, a pioneer stereo with a six disc player, originally 
worth $900 present value $400-500, twelve (12) autographed baseballs 
total value between $1450-1850, ten (10) binders of baseball cards total 
value about $5,000, autographed cards total value between $5330-6400, a 
set of black pearl earrings originally cost $1250 with a present value of 
$1500, and Olympic pins worth $200. 
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It is impossible to decipher from this ambiguous testimony which specific items 
Mr. Hildebrand was in fact missing. This testimony failed to establish such things as 
what "series of autographed baseballs" these were, who autographed the baseballs, what 
"specialty" cards were in these binders, what are "very specialty" cards, how many cards 
are in a "set of cards", and how many and what type of cards are in a "binder." 
Moreover, Mr. Rogers was not charged with burglary so charging him with the value of 
all the missing items would not be appropriate. See. State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, 
[^24, 40 P.3d 1143 (holding "[defendant may be ordered to pay restitution only for 
pecuniary damages resulting from the crime of receiving stolen property, and not for 
damages resulting from the burglary"); State v. HilL 727 P.2d 221, 223 (determining 
defendants could only be found guilty for value of property found in their possession, not 
total value of stolen items). 
The evidence offered by the state regarding the recovered property was equally 
unavailing in discerning the value of the property. Mr. Hildebrand testified that he had 
recovered the baseball from the front seat of the vehicle which "happened to be the 
particular one that was the most valuable of those . . .balls that I mentioned before." R. 
R. 176. While the trial court's finding only determined what items were stolen and not 
recovered, it is clearly erroneous to the extent it was used to determine the value of the 
recovered property. Even assuming that the value of the missing property was over 
$5,000, that does not satisfy the proof of value element which requires the state to prove 
that the recovered property had a value of $5,000 or more. 
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222:14. However, Mr. Hildebrand's earlier testimony regarding this "most valuable" 
baseball did not detail what type of baseball it was or why it was the "most valuable," 
instead, we are left with Mr. Hildebrand's speculation that the most valuable ball "I 
bought many years ago, for about 400 and I think it's worth well over 500 now." R. 
222:8 (emphasis added). No reference was made as to how Mr. Hildebrand came to the 
conclusion of the baseball's present worth. Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Rogers 
could be found in possession of this baseball found inside the vehicle, and this Court 
finds that Mr. Hildebrand's testimony establishes its worth, it would only support a class 
A misdemeanor. 
The state then asked Mr. Hildebrand if he had "received anything back, other than 
that baseball?" R. 222:14. Mr. Hildebrand answered, again in very general terms that he 
had received 
All of the baseballs that I mentioned before, the autographed balls. I_ 
believe all of them, there may be one or two missing, but I think they're all 
there. A lot of the cards that had been in the box underneath [the bed], but 
unfortunately, most of the most valuable ones were not recovered. Many of 
the binders, they had been all rearranged, all the pages had been taken out 
and shuffled and-and I'm sure some are missing out of those binders, 
because of that. I had stacks and stacks of empty pages -or of pages with 
cards in them that were not in the binders, that had to be put back in the 
binders, so I spent quite a bit of time trying to get them back in order and 
trying to figure out what's missing or not missing because of that. 
R. 222:14-15 (emphasis added). 
The state never attempted to have Mr. Hildebrand testify regarding which specific 
items were recovered or their value. During cross-examination, Mr. Hildebrand testified 
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that both of the Willie Mays cards were recovered which had a value of $400 each, 
unfortunately, most of the valuable cards were not recovered. R. 222:24. However, 
testimony was not offered regarding where the Willie Mays cards or other property were 
recovered from or how they could be attributed to Mr. Rogers. 
The testimony elicited from Mr. Allen by the prosecutor also failed to assist in 
establishing the value of the recovered property. Although Mr. Allen testified that he 
recognized some of the cards the two individuals were attempting to sell to him, the state 
never elicited testimony about which cards they were that he purchased and that Mr. 
Hildebrand subsequently recovered. R. 222:28-29. In addition, Mr. Allen testified there 
was no relationship between the amount he had written the check for and the value of the 
cards. R.222:31. In fact, Mr. Allen testified that he had no idea what the value of the 
baseball cards would have been. R. 222:31. 
The only other evidence offered regarding the recovered property was Detective 
Johnson's testimony. Detective Johnson testified on direct examination about the 
property found in the vehicle stating: 
Well, there were several items, several baseball cards in folders, like photo 
albums in the trunk, which were seized incident to arrest; but in the front of 
the car, there was a -in the front passenger seat, there was a baseball, a 
signed baseball, that was in a case, a plastic square case. And there was 
also another sealed baseball card on the -I believe it was on the floorboard 
of the passenger side. 
R. 222:36 (emphasis added). 
Again, even if the baseball and baseball card found in the passenger seat could be 
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attributed to Mr. Rogers, the state failed to establish their value. Defense counsel 
attempted to elicit more specific information from Detective Johnson regarding the 
recovered property. Detective Johnson testified during cross-examination that several 
items were recovered in a search of the co-defendant's apartment including "[t]he 
DVD/CD player,. . . several cards, and the Olympic pins . . . [and] a lot of loose photo 
sheets with cards in them." R. 222:41. However, this testimony still did not clarify what 
specific property was recovered to enable a value to be ascertained. 
In sum, the state presented only speculative and ambiguous testimony which did 
not establish the proof of value element of the charge let alone establish how the missing 
items found in the apartment and vehicle could be attributed to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:41. 
Even viewing this evidence regarding the recovered property in a light most favorable to 
the prosecution, and drawing all reasonable inference in favor of the prosecution, it does 
not support a finding of probable cause that Mr. Rogers possessed or controlled 
recovered property that was or exceeded $5,000. The state failed to sustain its burden of 
proof by presenting sufficient evidence on the proof of value element to support a second 
degree charge and the charged offense should have been dismissed or reduced 
accordingly. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that the state produced "sufficient 
evidence to establish the second degree felony charge before the Court granted the 
State's motion to reopen." R. 179 (emphasis in original). Because the state failed to 
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present sufficient evidence on essential elements of the offense it would have been 
barred from refiling under Brickey and due process. 
B. Appellant's Due Process Rights Were Violated When The Magistrate 
Allowed The State To Re-Open Its Case And Continued The Preliminary 
Hearing To Allow the State to Provide Evidence on The Proof Of Value 
Element of the Offense; Because the State Would Have Been Prohibited From 
Refilingy The Error Was Not Harmless. 
The magistrate's decision to allow the state to re-open and continue the 
preliminary hearing to present sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding on 
an essential element of the offense violated the mandatory language of Rule 7 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, the decision which is akin to a dismissal and 
refiling allowed the state to circumvent due process and the Brickey jurisprudence when 
it would have been prohibited from refiling had the case been dismiss or the offense level 
lowered due to the magistrate's determination at the first preliminary hearing of 
insufficient evidence to support a second degree felony. R. 222:54-61. 
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in relevant part the following: 
(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the 
magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. . . . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3). 
The language of Rule 7 is mandatory. The rule instructs the magistrate that if 
insufficient evidence has been provided to support the charge then the information 
"shall" be dismissed. The rule does not provide for the re-opening of a preliminary 
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hearing or its continuation under these circumstances. Further, this Court has determined 
that a motion to re-open a preliminary hearing is not a recognized motion under Utah's 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Johnson. 1989 Utah App. LEXIS 172, *3 (October 30, 
1989) (unpublished opinion); see_ also n.2. In addition, Rule 1102, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, only allows for the continuation of a preliminary hearing where "the 
magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is not sufficient and 
additional evidence is necessary for a bindover." Utah R. Evid. 1102 (c)(1). In this 
case, the judge did not continue the hearing based on the proffered hearsay evidence but 
instead stated that he would "continue [the hearing], if-if I don't think I've got enough 
for value, I'll continue to get the value resolved." R. 222:54. 
After determining the state had failed to provide sufficient evidence on the value 
of property recovered the judge stated "I will continue it for further hearing on the value 
and the issue of value will be the only issue that is in play." R. 222:58. While Rule 1102 
would have presumably allowed the judge to continue the hearing on the issue of the 
pawn receipt, the judge's primary basis for continuing the hearing was to allow the state 
to provide evidence as to the value of the recovered property. Only after the judge had 
decided to continue the hearing did he state that "because we are going to re-open this, it 
doesn't make sense to me to close . . .it off as to the pearls, so that issue is still open." R. 
222:58. However, defense counsel objected and the state stipulated that it would not 
bring in more evidence on the earrings stating "it will simply be the value of what was 
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found.1' R. 222:59. Therefore, the continuation of the preliminary hearing to allow the 
state to establish the proof of value element was not a valid basis under rule 1102. 
The court determined the state had provided sufficient evidence to permit the 
court to bind Mr. Rogers over, however, the court also determined that the state had 
failed to meet its burden regarding the value of the property recovered which could be 
contributed to Mr. Rogers7. R. 222:54. The court stated: 
Well, let me tell you what my concern is. I think there's enough to bind 
him over, and the question I have is the value issue. And I'll tell you how 
I'm looking at that and I'll hear from both of you, I will give enough - I 
will continue it, if - if I don't think I've got enough for value, I'll continue 
to get the value resolved. 
What I have is that there's a large amount of material stolen, and we've got 
enough value as to the material and there's specifics as to the material. The 
value I have as to specific material is that - I've had testimony, was 
involved here in some way, and we can address that more specifically; and 
what I'm looking at is an autographed baseball, of various values from $50 
to $500, one autographed baseball was found, it was cased, but there's 
no-there's no testimony as to identify it in any way, based on the testimony 
I've seen. So, it was worth at least $50, maybe $500. 
A number of baseball cards. And-and I believe given the statements made 
7It is unclear from the record whether the magistrate actually meant he had enough 
evidence to bindover but on a lesser charge or whether the magistrate believed that the 
state had met its burden as to the other elements of the offense but not on the value of the 
recovered property and its link to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:54-56. Stating, "I am in a situation 
where I don't have enough information about how much material was found and the 
value of the material found as contrasted with the value of the material stolen. This isn't 
burglary. This isn't a burglary charge." R. 222:58. The magistrate's recognition that the 
state had not presented "enough information" regarding what property was recovered or 
its value demonstrates that the court did not have enough evidence to bindover due to the 
state's failure to present sufficient evidence on an essential element of the offense. 
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by the defendant to the officer and the statements made by the co-
defendant, that he's tagged with all the baseball cards available here. So, in 
that sense, the -the baseball cards that were stolen clearly exceeded the 
value of $5,000. 
And the-the problem I have at this point is that I don't know how many 
baseball cards or sets of baseball cards were actually recovered, and I'd 
have to make a-an assumption that the value of the cards that was actually 
found at the apartment and in the car, was up to the - you know, sufficiently 
high an amount, that -that that's where we are. And I just don't have any 
information on that. 
Now, I-I'm willing to accept that all the baseball cards involved here, the 
defendant gets tagged with for purposes of this hearing; but I don't know 
how many sets of baseball cards there were or how far it reaches in terms of 
value that were actually found. 
It's very general testimony about having found some binders and some 
sheets in the car and at the apartment and individual baseball cards at 
various places. And you know, I'm very tempted to assume that-that those 
were the bulk of what was there, but just based on what I've heard, I'm 
-I'm not going to assume that. 
R. 222:54-56. 
The court then indicated that it would give the state nthe option of covering [the 
value of the recovered property] with further testimony at a continued hearing." R. 
222:56. The court then stated, "I still am in a situation where I don't have enough 
information about how much material was found and the value of the material found as 
contrasted with the value of the material stolen." R. 222:58. 
Under these circumstances, the magistrate was without discretion to allow the 
state to re-open and to continue the hearing to allow the state the further opportunity to 
present sufficient evidence on the proof of value element after the state had not been 
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diligent in its efforts to prepare for the first preliminary hearing. This is precisely the sort 
of piecemeal procedure that Brickey and its jurisprudence seeks to prevent. The 
magistrate's decision, in sum, abrogated Mr. Rogers' due process rights and his 
protections under the Brickey jurisprudence. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. 
The cases cited in Brickey demonstrate the potentially abusive practice in allowing 
the state to re-open or continue a preliminary hearing under circumstances like those that 
exist in this case. For example, in basing its decision in part on a desire "[t]o curb . . . 
abusive practices," the supreme court cited, inter alia, Holmes v. District Court. 668 P.2d 
11,15 (Colo. 1983); StockwelL 573 P.2d at 138-39 (Bistline, J. dissenting). The abusive 
practice eschewed in Holmes was "the undesirable practice of presenting as little 
evidence as possible at the preliminary hearing," then refiling charges and conducting an 
additional preliminary hearing if the minimal evidence introduced was not sufficient. 
Holmes. 668 P.2d at 15. In the portion of Holmes cited in Brickey. the Colorado 
Supreme Court recognized the threat to the role of the preliminary hearing caused by 
prosecutors resorting to this abusive practice. Where there are no ramifications for a 
failure to present sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing, "there is little incentive 
to comply with the requirements governing preliminary hearings." Id. 
Indeed, the potential for abuse in allowing the state to re-open or continue a 
preliminary hearing when the magistrate is not convinced that sufficient evidence exists 
to bindover are illustrated in the magistrates's comments regarding the preparation of 
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prosecutors in the other preliminary hearings he had presided over. The magistrate 
stated: 
. . . These preliminary hearings, for one reason or other, seem to come 
together fairly quickly; often the attorneys who are presenting them for the 
State are not the attorneys that maybe put the case together. That's the way 
life goes, I understand, the pressures that people are operating under here. 
But I also am seeing some real bare minimums on preliminary hearings, 
that make me a little uncomfortable. On occasion, I've felt uncomfortable 
not to bind over, but it seems to me that there's some fairly easy elements 
of proof here and ways in which the proof can be presented. 
I- I personally would like to see more proof than I sometimes get in these 
cases tying values, people to objects and things like that. I recognize on 
-on some point that there- there may be a level of diminishing returns for 
the various components in here. I've indicated where I have some concerns 
at this point. . . . 
R. 222:60-61. 
In addition, defense counsel's arguments during the motion to quash hearing 
reflect that re-opening preliminary hearings appears to be happening with some 
frequency when prosecutors' "bare minimum[]" evidence was insufficient to obtain a 
bindover. Voicing concern regarding this potentially abusive practice, defense counsel 
stated: 
Of course, I have issues with the re-opening of the preliminary hearing. I 
think that's a completely inappropriate measure. I think there are other 
measures that can be taken and I think this case, certainly, we're not 
dealing with an innocent miscalculation of the evidence, we're dealing with 
the State making a calculated risk by going forward with what they know to 
be limited evidence and taking that risk by going forward. And I think 
once they've taken that risk, I don't think they get a third bite at the apple 
to try again and again and again and again. 
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And the other issue that I brought up in my motion that I hope the Court 
will give serious consideration to is the fact that we're running into this 
situation often where preliminary hearings are allowed to be re-opened 
where essentially defense counsel is aiding in the prosecution of their own 
clients because we're pointing out defects in the case. And then what 
happens is the State then gets an opportunity to come back a second or 
third time, even and correct those defects, where the case should have been 
legitimately dismissed or at least bound over at a much lesser level, had the 
preliminary hearing process stopped at the point both parties had rested. 
R. 224:4-5. 
Defense counsel's concerns regarding the potential abuse inherent in the power to 
re-open or continue a preliminary hearing because the state failed to come prepared with 
the necessary evidence to bindover are similar to those articulated by the dissenting 
opinion in StockwelL cited by the Brickey court, regarding the potential for abuse in 
allowing the state to refile charges after miscalculating the amount of evidence necessary 
for a bindover. See Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647; StockwelL 573 P.2d at 138-39 (Bistline, J. 
dissenting). In StockwelL Justice Bistline states: 
To allow a dismissal and refiling every time the prosecutor miscalculates 
the quantum of evidence needed to gain the desired commitment, as Judge 
Hargraves later ruled, 
" . . . would not only do violence to the due process rights of 
this Petitioner but would establish a very dangerous precedent 
which could adversely affect numerous other person charged 
with crime. If the prosecutor could do this once, why not 
twice, ten times or innumberable times? Conceivably a 
defendant could spend months in jail, not being able to make 
bond, and remaining always at the preliminary hearing stage 
with never a hope for an early trial on the merits of the case . . 
»i 
StockwelL 573 P.2d at 138-39 (Bistline, J. dissenting). 
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Indeed, allowing a preliminary hearing to be re-opened or continued under 
circumstances such as these would completely nullify the requirements of rule 7(i) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the constitutional limits outlined in the Brickey 
jurisprudence. Instead, 
If the State has sufficient evidence to bring an accused to trial, it should be 
prepared to offer such at one preliminary examination and not rely on 
bolstering its case at a subsequent preliminary examination, if necessary. It 
is dilatory to present evidence on an installment basis at different 
preliminaries. Let the State present its case at the preliminary and be done 
with it. If it is insufficient, then the prosecution is at an end unless new 
evidence becomes available or other good cause is shown. Not only is 
refiling without cause unnecessarily burdensome to our overcrowded 
courts, but it may constitute harassment of an accused. 
Jones. 481 P.2d at 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). 
Although, the supreme court noted in Brickey. the holding of Harper v. District 
Court of Oklahoma Co.. 484 P.2d 891 (1971) "that good cause to continue a preliminary 
hearing for further investigation might exist when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates 
the quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover and further investigation clearly 
would not be dilatory," our supreme court did not adopt the "good cause to continue" 
aspect of the holding. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644. 647 n.5. Instead, in Morgan. the supreme 
court adopted "innocent miscalculation as a subsection of other good cause . . . 
[justifying refiling]." Morgan. 2001 UT 87 at 1J19. Reading the Morgan holding to 
include continuances would set an extremely negative precedent and would "infringe on 
[the] due process rights of a defendant." IJL Even if this Court were to interpret the 
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Morgan holding as permitting continuances for good cause, good cause did not exist in 
this case where the prosecutor was clearly dilatory in her preparation for the first 
preliminary hearing. See Point 1. 
The magistrate determined that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence 
on the proof of value element to allow the court to bind Mr. Rogers over on a second 
degree felony charge. R. 222:54-58. Once the judge had determined that there was 
insufficient evidence on an essential element of the offense presented, the judge was 
required under rule 7(i) to either discharge and dismiss Mr. Rogers or bind him over on a 
lesser charge. If the court had dismissed the charge at this point, the state would have 
been barred from refiling because the prosecutor's dilatory preparation does not qualify 
as an innocent miscalculation. Therefore, allowing the state the opportunity to produce 
sufficient evidence to support a second degree felony charge by re-opening and 
continuing the hearing was not harmless error. Even if the Court were to recognize a 
magistrate's discretion to grant a continuance absent a procedural rule allowing it, a 
continuance must still be limited by due process and Brickey. Otherwise, continuances 
would eviscerate the Brickey rule since it would allow prosecutors to circumvent due 
process and the protections offered by the Brickey jurisprudence regardless of 
circumstance. 
In sum, a prosecutor's decision to go forward with a preliminary hearing 
unprepared does not qualify as an innocent miscalculation justifying refiling. Therefore, 
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when the prosecutor's failure to prepare results in insufficient evidence being presented 
on essential elements of the offense charged, the magistrate is required to either dismiss 
the charge or bindover on a lesser offense. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure does not recognize a motion to re-open. Nor does Rule 1102 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence allow a continuance to be granted so the prosecution can attempt 
again to establish essential elements of the offense. Allowing either a continuance or a 
motion to re-open is akin to allowing the state to dismiss and refile a case while 
effectively circumventing due process and the protections outlined in Brickey. Because 
the state would have been prohibited from refiling under these circumstances, the error 
was not harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Daniel Bagley Rogers respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
district court's denial of his motion to quash the bindover and order the information to be 
dismissed. Alternatively, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court order the 
charges to be reduced to a class A misdemeanor. 
SUBMITTED THIS lo**- day of May, 2004. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL ROGERS, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Motion to Quash Bindover) 
Case No. 021101432 FS 
Judge PAT B. BRIAN Defendant. 
f 1 The above-entitled matter came before the Court on April 29, 2003 for hearing on Daniel 
Rogers (Defendant) Motion to Quash Bindover. The Court has reviewed Defendant's motion 
and supplemental memorandum and the State's opposition to Defendant's motion. Having 
considered those memoranda along with oral arguments, the applicable constitutional provisions, 
statutes and case law, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash. 
BACKGROUND 
Tf2 On August 20, 2002, the Defendant was charged by information for theft by receiving 
stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 and theft by 
deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405. 
Tf3 A preliminary hearing was scheduled for November 7, 2002. On November 4, 2002, the 
State requested a continuance. That same day, the Court granted the State's motion to continue 
and the preliminary hearing was rescheduled for November 26, 2002. 
%4 On November 26, 2002, Defendant failed to appear. The Court issued a bench warrant 
for Defendant and rescheduled the preliminary hearing for December 17, 2002. 
J5 On December 17, 2002, the preliminary hearing was held before the court, Roth, J. 
000175 
Tf6 The following facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, were established at 
the December 17, 2002, preliminary hearing. On July 23, 2002, sometime between one p.m. to 
eight p.m., Robert Paul Hildebrand's, (Hildebrand) apartment was broken into and many items 
stolen. Specifically, an unopened six disc, DVD player worth $750, a minolta 35 mm camera 
worth $200, a pioneer stereo with a six disc player, originally worth $900 present value $400-
500, twelve (12) autographed baseballs total value between $1450-1850, ten (10) binders of 
baseball cards total value about $5000, autographed cards total value between $5330-6400, a set 
of black pearl earrings originally cost $1250 with a present value of $1500, and Olympic pins 
worth $200. Hildebrand contacted the police department. 
%J The following day, on July 24, 2002, Hildebrand contacted several, local baseball card 
shops to tell them to watch for the stolen items. Hildebrand contacted baseball card shop owner, 
Elvin Allen (Allen), about the stolen baseballs and cards. Within an hour, two men entered 
Allen's store with items that Allen believed were Hildebrand's stolen items. Allen purchased 
some of the items from the men using a check. Allen immediately contacted Hildebrand and 
informed Hildebrand that he had Hildenbrand's stolen items. 
f 8 Allen cancelled the check. Later that day, Allen received a call from a check cashing 
place, as shown on his caller ID. Allen contacted Hildebrand and told him that the people were 
attempting to cash the check at a check cashing place and gave Hildebrand the phone number 
displayed on his caller ID. 
|^9 Hildebrand contacted the police and gave them the phone number to trace the address of 
the check cashing location. The police arrived and observed a signed, encased baseball in the 
front seat and a baseball card on the floor of the front, passenger seat of the vehicle that the 
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Defendant and his companion, Joshua Boone (Boone) arrived in. The vehicle that Defendant and 
Boone arrived in was owned by Boone's girlfriend. The police detained Defendant and Boone. 
In the trunk of the vehicle, were many baseball cards. Defendant informed the police that he 
found the baseball cards in a dumpster. Thereafter, police discovered at Boone's apartment, 
multiple baseballs, binders, baseball cards, DVD/CD player, and Olympic pins. 
TflO At the December 17, 2002 hearing, after the State rested, Defendant argued that there was 
insufficient evidence to bindover. Specifically, Defendant argued that the value of the items was 
not sufficiently established to bindover for the second degree felony charge because the only 
evidence associated with Defendant was one baseball and one card. Even viewing the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the State, this did not amount to $5000, which is an element of the 
charge for theft by receiving stolen property. Defendant argued, therefore, that the bindover 
should be denied on that count. 
^11 The State moved to reopen because the Prosecutor was "given some more information" 
and needed to take some further testimony. Defendant objected, arguing that the State rested its 
case. The Court granted the motion to reopen. 
T|12 The State recalled the police officer to the stand and asked him questions about the black 
pearl earrings. The officer indicated that the earrings were pawned. Although the officer did not 
have the pawn receipt with him, he recalled that it was in evidence at the sheriffs office. 
f 13 The Court sua sponte continued the hearing on the limited issue of value of the items 
found that were attributable to Defendant, which the Court stated was the baseballs and baseball 
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cards found in the car and the home.1 Defendant objected arguing that a continuance was in 
opposition to the purpose of a preliminary hearing because after the State rests its case and 
Defense counsel reveals all of the State's weaknesses, the court can just grant a continuance, 
allow the State to gather more evidence for the next hearing, so that there would be sufficient 
evidence to bindover the Defendant. 
U 14 On January 7, 2003 a hearing was held on the limited issue of the value of the items 
found attributable to the Defendant in the car and at the home. 
Tfl5 The Court, Roth, /., bound over for trial the first charge for theft by receiving 
stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of § 76-6-408 and dismissed the second 
charge for theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of § 76-6-405 
LAW 
^16 At a preliminary hearing "the prosecution must present evidence sufficient for the 
magistrate to find probable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed and that 
the defendant has committed it. . . . The evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution with all inferences resolved in the prosecution's favor. . . . The defendant should be 
bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference 
to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim." State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, 
^[10,44 P.3d 730 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.). Recently, the Utah 
Supreme Court clarified that the "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover is less 
1
 The Court also continued the hearing on the issue of the earrings and the pawn ticket. 
Defendant objected and the State stipulated that the earrings and pawn ticket would not be an 
issue at the next hearing. 
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than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, Tfl6, 20 
P.3d 300. While the prosecution must produce "believable evidence of all the elements of the 
crime charged" in order to sustain its burden at the preliminary hearing stage, "unlike a motion 
for a directed verdict, this evidence need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. at Tf 15. 
1J17 Section 76-6-408 provides that theft by receiving stolen property occurs when: 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing 
that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds 
or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the 
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the 
owner of it. 
Tfl8 Theft of property is a second degree felony if the value of the property or services is or 
exceeds $5000. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(a)(i). If the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300 then the theft charge is a class B misdemeanor. § 76-6-412(l)(d). 
ANALYSIS 
Tfl9 Defendant claims that the Court improperly granted the State's motion to reopen. 
Specifically, Defendant argues that a motion to 'reopen' a preliminary hearing is not a motion 
recognized in the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure citing State v. Johnson, 1989 Utah App. 
LEXIS 172, *3 (October 30, I989)(unpublishedopinion). 
[^20 In opposition, the State argues that there was sufficient evidence to establish the second 
degree felony charge before the Court granted the State's motion to reopen. The Court agrees 
with the State. 
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f21 The Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence presented before the motion to 
reopen was granted because the evidence presented established that Defendant was in possession 
or control of $5000 or more of stolen property. The evidence showed that Defendant was in 
possession or control of the property that was pawned to Allen because the check was written in 
Defendant's name. Defendant was also in possession or control of the property that was in the 
vehicle that Defendant and Boone arrived in at the check cashing place. The evidence reflected 
that there was a signed, encased baseball in the front seat and a baseball card on the front, floor 
of the passenger seat. In the trunk of the vehicle there were multiple baseball cards. Defense 
counsel inquired of the Court, Roth, J., whether the evidence at the apartment would be 
considered and the Court, Roth, J., affirmed that it would be. Defense counsel did not object. 
Applying the evidence obtained in the apartment as well as the evidence obtained in the vehicle 
and at the pawn shop, the Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence from Hildebrand's 
testimony that the value of the stolen property recovered was $5000 or more.2 
2
 Nevertheless, the Court notes that although a motion to reopen is not a motion within 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court's, Roth, J., granting of the motion to reopen was 
harmless error. The Court could have dismissed the charges under Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). 
However, the dismissal and discharge would not have precluded the State from refiling because 
good cause to re-file exists "when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence 
required to obtain a bindover." State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^ |14, 34 P.3d 767 (Utah 
200\)(citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 n.5 (Utah 1986). It is clear to this Court that 
there were no abusive practices involved in the State's motion to reopen, but simply an innocent 
miscalculation of the evidence necessary to bindover. Witnesses that were called at the first 
hearing were recalled during that hearing and at the second hearing to provide more detail about 
the value of the items. There does not appear to be any bad faith on the part of the prosecutor, 
which is what could prevent the State from refiling. Since the result would have been the same 
because the State could have refiled and another preliminary hearing could have been held before 
the Court, Roth, J., this Court notes that even if the evidence was insufficient, the Court, Roth, J., 
committed harmless error that was not prejudicial to the Defendant. If anything, the Court, Roth, 
J., prevented an inconvenience to the Defendant by reopening the State's case. State v. Morgan, 
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Tf22 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash 
So ordered this/7? day of June, 2003. 
Judge PAT B. BRIA^ \ 
Third District Court%d&e »' ,, 
2001 UT 87, f 10. 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
DANIEL ROGERS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 021101432 
031100601 
031100343 
Judge Terry Christiansen 
COMES NOW, DANIEL ROGERS, the defendant in this case, and hereby 
acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s): 
CRIME AND STATUTE DEGREE PUNISHMENT 
Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, 3 ° Felony 
§76-6-408(021101432) 
Burglary, §76-6-202 2° Felony 
(031100601) 
Theft, 3° Felony 
§76-6-404(031100343) 
0-5 years USP; $0-5,000 fine + 85% 
surcharge 
1-15 years prison; fine up to $10,000 
plus an 85% surcharge. 
0-5 years USP; $0-5,000 fine + 85% 
surcharge 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am pleading guilty are as follows: 
The defendant, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of another, 
in Salt Lake County, with the intent to commit a theft. 
The defendant, a party to the offense, did receive, retain, or dispose of the property of another 
knowing that it had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, or did conceal, sell, 
withhold or aid in the concealment, selling, or withholding of the property from the owner, knowing 
the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
The defendant, a party to the offense, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of Deloris Lenhart with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of hte 
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property is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000. 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that 
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
Case Number 021101432 — On July 23, 2002,1 possessed property belonging to Robert Paul 
Hildebrand, knowing or believing that such property had probably been stolen, and I intended to 
deprive Mr. Hildebrand of the property. The value of the property was between $1,000 but less than 
$5,000. 
Case Number 031100601 - Between November 1, 2002, and January 15, 2003,1 unlawfully 
entered the home of Ben and Ed Rogers, located at 12100 East Big Cottonwood Road, in Salt Lake 
County, with the intent to commit a theft. 
Case Number 031100343 - On July 5, 2002,1 possessed a number of belongings/property 
belonging to Deloris Lenhart with the intent to deprive Ms. Lenhart of the property and the value of 
the property was more than $1,000 but less than $5,000. 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize 
that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined 
by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if appointed for me. 
2. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is Shannon Romero, and I have 
had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty plea(s) with my attorney. 
3. I have read this statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, my 
rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my pleas of guilty. 
4. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and a right to a speedy trial in open court 
by an impartial jury. 
5. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that 
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I have the right to compel my witness(s) by subpoena at State expense to testify in 
court in my behalf. 
6. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; but if I choose not to do so I 
cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself; and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify, 
7. I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me I need only plead "not guilty," 
and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial, the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before 
a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
8. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or 
the judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if I could not 
afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State. 
9. I know the maximum sentence(s) set forth above may be imposed for each offense to 
which I plead guilty, and that the sentence(s) and may be for a prison term, fine, or 
both. I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge, 
required by the Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I 
may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, 
including restitution on charges dismissed as part of this plea agreement. 
10. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my plea is to more 
than once charge. I also know that the court may order that the sentences will 
run consecutively if these offenses were committed while I was imprisoned, on 
probation, on parole, or awaiting sentencing. 
11. I know and understand that by pleading guilty , I am waiving and giving up my 
statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also 
know that by entering such plea(s), I am admitting and do so admit that I have 
committed the conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my 
plea(s) (is) (are) entered. 
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12. I understand that any motion to withdraw my guilty plea(s) must be filed within 
thirty (30) days after sentencing, plea. I understand that any motion to 
withdraw my guilty plea(s) will only be granted if the Court finds good cause to 
do so. 
13. My plea(s) of guilty is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties, and provisions of this plea bargain, 
if any, are fully set forth as follows: 
* Dismiss remaining charges, dismiss case number 031100193 
* Restitution on all cases 
* State stipulates to a recommendation of suspended prison time with Odyssey House 
inpatient as a condition of probation. 
* 2nd degree felony and 3rd degree felony sentences to run consecutively but suspended; two 
3 rd degree felony sentences to run concurrently to each other. 
* Sery plea on case number 021101432, preserving the right to appeal the trial court's 
decision on defense counsel's motion (Order issued June 16,2003) 
There are no other promises. 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation or probation or 
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either my defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also 
know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge may do are 
also not binding on the Judge. 
15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind has been made to induce me to 
plead guilty, and no promises except those in this document have been made to me. 
16. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand 
it. I know that I am free to change or take out anything contained in this statement. I do 
not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
18. I am 2pt-\ years of age; I have attended school through the / ^/ grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. I am not under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; mentally capable of understanding 
the proceedings and the consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, 
or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entering my plea. 
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Dated this 15 day of September, 2003. 
>ANIEL ROGERS, DEFENDANT 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for DANIEL ROGERS, the defendant above, and that I know 
he has read the statement or that I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and believe 
that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and 
these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
affidavit, are accurate and true. 
SHANNON ROMERO 7974 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against DANIEL ROGERS, 
the defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the declaration, including 
the elements of the offense of the charges(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or 
coercion to encourage a plea has been offered to the defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on the record 
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) (is) (are) entered and acceptance of 
the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR # y ? 3 f 
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ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the defendant 
and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made, and 
IT IS SO ORDERED that the defendant's plea of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the 
statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this 1~7 day of September, 2003. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Rule 7 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 436 
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate. 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant 
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without 
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available 
magistrate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be 
filed without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as 
is reasonably feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a 
determination shall be made as to whether there is probable cause to continue 
to detain the arrestee. The determination may be made by any magistrate, 
although if the arrestee is charged with a first degree felony or a capital 
offense, the magistrate may not be a justice court judge. The arrestee need not 
be present at the probable cause determination. 
(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magis-
trate, although the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone, 
telefaxed, or otherwise electronically transmitted to the magistrate. 
(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be 
reduced to a sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause 
issue to the magistrate for decision. The person reading the statement to the 
magistrate shall verify to the magistrate that the person is reading the written 
statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement that person's name and 
title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate, and the 
determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement. 
(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or 
otherwise electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as 
practicable, be filed with the court where the case will be filed. 
(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it 
determine whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee. 
(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to 
detain the arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the 
arrestee. 
(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the 
arrestee, the magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The 
bail determination shall coincide with the recommended bail amount in the 
Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds substantial cause to 
deviate from the Schedule. 
(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the 
Justice Court Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures 
availability of magistrates consistent with the need in that particular district. 
The schedule shall take into account the case load of each of the magistrates, 
their location and their willingness to serve. 
(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplish-
ment of other procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to 
in paragraph (c)(1) above. 
(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to 
the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the 
proper magistrate under these rules. 
(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to 
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which 
a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 
77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to forfeit bail, 
waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and consent to 
disposition of the case in the county in which the person was arrested, is held, 
or is present. 
(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in 
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding 
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or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant 
is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county. 
(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant. 
(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor 
for which a voluntary forfeiture oi bail may be entered as a conviction under 
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay 
before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail 
under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section 
77-20-1. 
(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant: 
(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy; 
(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the infor-
mation and how to obtain them; 
(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail, and 
(e)(5) tha t the defendant is noi required to make any statement, and tha t 
the statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in 
a court of law. 
(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph 
(e) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and 
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any 
attorney by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magis-
trate as provided by law. 
(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be 
extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules 
and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised 
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to 
a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the mag-
istrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the 
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall 
be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the defendant 
is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant 
is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for 
good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if the defendant 
is indicted. 
(i)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held 
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The 
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the 
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call 
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine 
adverse witnesses. 
(i)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, tha t the defendant be bound over to 
answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on 
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground tha t it was 
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary 
examination. 
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(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magis-
trate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magis-
trate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. 
The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is con-
cluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators 
to be excluded from the courtroom. 
(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district 
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall 
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of 
the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any 
typewritten transcript. 
(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, 
the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(1X1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material 
witness in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, 
the magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a sum considered 
adequate for the appearance of the witness. 
(1)(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the 
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies 
or is otherwise legally discharged. 
(1X3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be 
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the 
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be 
discharged. 
(1)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent 
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at 
the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; November 1, 1996; April 29, 1998; April 1, 
1999; April 1, 2004.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
amendment is made in recognition of district 
court consolidation, whereby a district court 
judge may sit as a committing magistrate. Rule 
7(h)(1) as amended permits a defendant who 
has waived the preliminary examination, or 
has been bound over, to enter a plea immedi-
ately before the district judge and avoid the 
necessity of additional appearances. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2004 amend-
ment added Subdivision (c) and redesignated 
the following subdivisions accordingly. 
Cross-References. — Court reporters, Title 
78, Chapter 56. 
Exclusion of witnesses and others, § 78-7-4. 
Juvenile committing felony, hearing and cer-
tification to district court, § 78-3a-603. 
Juvenile court, transfer of criminal proceed-
ing to, § 78-3a-501. 
Police lineup, right to have attorney present, 
§ 77-8-2 
Preliminary examination may be waived, 
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13. 
Rights of accused persons. Utah Const., Art. 
I, Sees. 7 to 12; § 77-1-6. 
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to proceedings 
for ba i l Rule 1101, U.R.E. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. 
Appeals. 
Duties of magistrate. 
Preliminary hearing. 
—Binding accused over. 
Different offense. 
Failure to sign order. 
— Concurrent jurisdiction of circuit and district 
courts. 
—Evidence. 
—Nature of right. 
—Necessity. 
—Public access. 
—Right to counsel. 
Waiver. 
—Standard of proof. 
—Time. 
Delay for good cause. 
Rule 1102. Reliable hearsay in criminal preliminary exam-
inations. 
(a) Statement of the rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal prelim-
inary examinations. 
(b) Definition of reliable hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary 
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes: 
(b)(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence; 
(b)(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary 
examination; 
(b)(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any 
exhibit; 
(b)(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records; 
(b)(5) medical and autopsy reports and records; 
(b)(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace 
officer; 
(b)(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual 
offense which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in 
accordance with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
(b)(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed 
verbatim which is: 
(b)(8)(A) under oath or affirmation; or 
(b)(8)(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement 
made therein is punishable; 
(b)(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of 
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(c) Continuance for production of additional evidence. If hearsay evidence is 
proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the 
hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if: 
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(c)(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted 
is not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or 
(c)(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly 
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests 
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice. 
(Added effective April 1, 1999.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 1102 
applies only in criminal preliminary examina-
tions, and implements language added by 
amendment to Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, effective July 1, 1995: 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to 
a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether 
probable cause exists unless otherwise pro-
vided by statute. Nothing in this constitution 
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evi-
dence as defined by statute or rule in whole or 
in part at any preliminary examination to de-
termine probable cause or at any pretrial pro-
ceeding with respect to release of the defendant 
if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
Discovery is allowed under Rule 16, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as by case 
law and other statutes. 
Accordingly, paragraph (a) provides for ad-
missibility of "reliable hearsay" evidence in 
criminal preliminary examinations (commonly 
called "preliminary hearings"). To the extent 
that State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 
1980), prohibited the use of hearsay evidence at 
preliminary examinations, that case has been 
abrogated. 
Paragraph (b) defines ^reliable hearsay" in 
subparagraphs (1) through (8). Evidence which 
is admissible under any other law or rule of 
evidence is not rendered inadmissible by any-
thing in paragraph (b). 
Subparagraph (b)(2) specifically incorporates 
hearsay tha t would be admissible under U.R.E. 
804 but eliminates the foundational element of 
unavailability. 
Subparagraph (b)(3) permits the admission 
of exhibits in preliminary hearings even though 
the necessary foundation for admissibility is by 
hearsay only. For example, proving the chain of 
custody for controlled substances may be ac-
complished under this section without calling 
the witnesses in the chain. 
Subparagraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) permit the 
specified types of reports and records to be 
admitted without the testimony of the person 
who prepared the report or record or the custo-
dian of the record. If there is special reason for 
exploring foundation or authenticity, subpara-
graph (c) gives the magistrate power to require 
additional evidence after a continuance. 
Subparagraph (b)(6) is similar to the "fellow 
officer" rule applicable to search or arrest war-
rant affidavits as providing sufficiently "reli-
able" evidence. 
Subparagraph (b)(7) requires that a child 
victim's hearsay report be close in time to the 
event reported and that it be recorded in com-
pliance with the conditions prescribed in Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.5(l)(a) through 
(d). This subparagraph does not necessitate a 
hearing under Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure 15.5(1 )(e) through (h) as a prerequisite to 
admission at a preliminary examination. 
Under subparagraph (b)(8), written, re-
corded, or transcribed testimony of non-testify-
ing witnesses is admissible if it is sworn, af-
firmed, or given under notification that false 
statements are prosecutable. The potential for 
prosecution under perjury or other criminal 
provisions tends to ensure the reliability of 
such testimony. 
Subparagraph (b)(9) provides catchall admis-
sibility for other forms of hearsay of similar 
reliability, not unlike U.R.E. Rules 803(24) and 
804(5) provide under existing hearsay excep-
tions. Unlike U.R.E. Rules 803(24) and 804(5), 
there is no requirement that advance notice be 
given to the adverse party of evidence offered 
under subparagraph (b)(9). If there is special 
reason for exploring foundation or authenticity, 
subparagraph (c) gives the magistrate power to 
require additional evidence after a contin-
uance. 
Paragraph (c) provides for continuances in 
the preliminary examination to enable a party 
to provide live witnesses or a more reliable form 
of hearsay where a party is substantially dis-
advantaged by the admission or exclusion of 
hearsay evidence proffered under this rule. 
Under subparagraph (c)(1), the prosecution 
can get a continuance where hearsay evidence 
is not admitted and would be necessary to get 
the case bound over. 
Under subparagraph (c)(2), a defendant may 
obtain a continuance by demonstrating that he 
is substantially and unfairly disadvantaged by 
a particular proffer of evidence that would be 
otherwise admissible under the rule and the 
disadvantage outweighs the interests of the 
witness and the efficient administration of jus-
tice. In making a decision as to whether the 
defendant is substantially and unfairly disad-
vantaged by the use of reliable hearsay evi-
dence, a magistrate may, among other factors, 
take into consideration the limitations on dis-
covery available to the defendant. 
Either party is at liberty to subpoena and call 
any live witnesses whose testimony would be 
germane to the determination of probable 
cause. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec* 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
